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Compartmentazed Thinking
and the Clean ater Act
Christine A. Klein*
M odern water pollution law traces back to the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.' Addi-
tional significant amendments followed in 1977
and 1987.2 These statutory enactments, collectively known
as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), address the pollution of a
single medium-water.3 Congress tackled separately the dis-
charge of pollutants into the air and the burying of solid and
hazardous wastes beneath the land through the Clean Air
Act ("CAA'4 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, respectively.5 This type of compartmentalized regulation
became a hallmark of federal environmental law 6 Congress'
methodical, medium-by-medium approach made a good
deal of sense during the second half of the twentieth century
because the country began to recognize the need for com-
prehensive, federal regulation of matters previously thought
to be within the states' purview./ By compartmentalizing
* Christine Klein is the Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law and
Director, LL.M. Program in Environmental and Land Use Law, at
the University ofFlorida, Levin College ofLaw
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972). The original Act was passed in 1948 and amended numerous
times prior to the 1972 amendments. See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY LAw 733 (5th ed. 2008).
2. Water Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 100 Stat. 7 (1987); Clean Water Act
("CW"), Pub. L. No. 95-21', 91 Stat. 1566 (19"). See WILLIAM RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 247 (2d ed. 1994) ("Water pollution law today begins
with an intimidating 90-page Act of Congress, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, supplemented by a 45-pager in the form
of the Clean Water Act of 197, and an 82-page follow-up called the Water
Quality Act of 1987.").
3. Since the passage of the 1977 amendments, the statute became known as the
Clean Water Act. S ummary ofthe Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cwa.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2012).
4. DoREMUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 608 (describing the 1970 legislation as "the
framework of the Modern Clean Air Act" which "calls for national uniform air
quality standards primarily implemented by the states but backstopped by a
variety of federal technology-based controls . . . .").
5. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (2006).
6. Robert L. Fischman, 7he Divides ofEnvironmental Law and the Problem of
Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 663-64 (2008).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) ("The Congress finds . .. that while the collec-
tion and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function
of State, regional, and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal ... have
become a matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal
action. . . .").
various types of pollution into distinct regulatory boxes,
Congress broke down the potentially overwhelming prob-
lem of pollution into manageable, bite-sized chunks. This
regulatory approach-although clean and logical-unfor-
tunately ignores the messier, on-the-ground reality of cross-
media interactions among water, air, and land. For example,
around 1979, refiners began to add methyl tertiary butyl
ether ("MTBE") to motor vehicle gasoline fuels to improve
air quality,8 only to learn that MTBE was contaminating
groundwater supplies.' Similarly, coal-fired power plants
emitted sulfur dioxide through tall stacks intended to render
air pollutants harmless through dilution.o In actual effect,
sulfur dioxide combined with other pollutants and returned
to the earth in the form of acid rain, which pollutes water
and land."
This phenomenon of compartmentalized environmental
regulation is widely recognized. As one scholar explained, "we
divide environmental law into a number of pigeon holes."' 2
Three divisions are especially prominent: (1) subject matter
(pollution control v. natural resources management);'3 (2)
regulatory approaches (categorical prohibitions v. utilitarian,
effects-based limits);4 and (3) statutory attributes (detailed
guidance v. delegation of agency discretion).15 Some worry
that current practices inhibit efficient and invigorating infor-
mation sharing among a variety of related subfields.16 Others
have called for a variety of remedial approaches, including
8. Alethyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MITBE): Gasoline, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http:/ivv .epa.gov/mtbegas.htm (last updated Nov. 26, 2012).
9. Aethyl Tertary Buty Ether (M1TBE): Drinking Ware, U.S. EN17L. PROT.
AGENCY, http://iviv.epa.gov/mtbe/water.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2012)
(explaining that MTBE can contaminate drinking water through "leaking un-
derground and above ground fuel storage tanks, pipe lines, refueling spills,
automobile accidents damaging the fuel tank, consumer disposal of 'old' gaso-
line, emissions from older marine engines, and to a lesser degree, storm water
runoff, and precipitation mixed with MTBE in the air").
10. Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating 7hought ays: Re-Opening of the Environ-
mental Mind., 1989 Wis. L. REv. 463, 468 n.20 (1989).
11. Id
12. Fischman, supra note 6, at 663.
13. Id at 666-70.
14. Id. at 670-75.
15. Id. at 676-81.
16. See id. at 665.
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those that employ "longitudinal analyses,"1 "integration-
ist multimodality,' " and the synthesis of "a more coherent
understanding of environmental law in all its dazzling, infu-
riating variations.""
Departing from such broad studies of environmental divi-
sions, this Article focuses on the compartmentalized approach
of a single statute, the CWA. Part I dissects the CWA regime
and its underlying tension between holistic and compart-
mentalized approaches to water pollution control. This part
features a schematic diagram of the "boxes" of the CWA that
cleave water into constituent parts recognized by law, but not
by nature. Part II undertakes a deeper examination of this
segmentation instinct, and suggests that political theory and
cognitive psychology may supply explanations for its force.
In particular, the discussion considers four aspects of politi-
cal theory-legal baggage from the New Deal, pragmatism,
incrementalism, and political competition-and two tools
recognized by cognitive psychology-schema and heuristics.
Finally, Part III illustrates specific CWA disputes in which
segmented thinking may have produced cognitive illusions
that run counter to the purposes of the statute.
Commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the stat-
ute, this Article pays homage to the legislation's impressive
accomplishments. At the same time, this Article traces some
of the CWAs current limitations directly back to the era of
its enactment, and suggests that such limitations were the
result of unfortunate political and cognitive constraints,
rather than careful legislative design. Armed with such his-
torical insights, future Congresses should revisit and amend
the CWA to reflect a more progressive, holistic approach to
environmental regulation.
1. The Clean Water Act: Dissecting
Integrity
A. The Holistic Impulse
"The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters.
-Clean Water Act § 101(a)20
17. Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 493 (describing "longitudinal" analyses as those
that incorporate systematic environmental assessments across the media ofwa-
ter, air, and land).
18. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environ mental Law: Integra-
tionistandMulim odal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLKY REv. "1, 792-95
(2011) (defining "multimodal" as the use of multiple methods of protecting
the environment, including a variety of policy instruments, tools, and institu-
tions and "integrationist" as "processes that seek to connect or link multiple
aspects of a system in a holistic, synthesized, or coordinated way').
19. Fischman, supra note 6, at 662.
20. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). See generaly Christine A. Klein,
On Integrity: Sone Considerarions for Yater Lau, 56 ALA. L. REV. 00) 10 1
(2005) (explaining that "[t]he statutory statement of purpose incorporates a
sweeping acknowledgement of the relationship between water policy and in-
tegrity"); Robert W Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy:
As Congress drafted one of the seminal pieces of modern
environmental legislation, it deliberately called for a broad,
systemic approach to water pollution 1 As the House Report
explained, "tlhe word 'integrity ... is intended to convey a
concept that refers to a condition in which the natural struc-
ture and function of ecosystems is maintained." Despite its
invocation of integrity, Congress did not define the term.
Instead, it simply suggested that pollution is the antithesis of
integrity by defining "pollution" as "the man-made or man-
induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and
radiological integrity of water."23
Broad, ecological thinking had captured the public spot-
light in the years leading up to the passage of the CWA.24 The
modern science of ecology traced back to the mid-twentieth
century work of Aldo Leopold, Eugene Odum, and others.
In 1953, Leopold wrote of a "land ethic" that "simply enlarges
the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters,
plants, and animals, or collectively: the land."26 About the
same time, Odum conducted work on the ecosystem, which
he described as "a system composed of biotic communities
and their abiotic environment interacting with each other. "27
In 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, an expos6
of the environmental and human health impacts of dichlo-
rodiphenyltrichloroethane (commonly known as DDT) and
other chemicals. 28 Just three years before the passage of the
CWA, Time Magazine announced that 1969 was the "year of
ecology" and predicted that pollution would "soon replace
the Viet Nam war as the nation's major issue of protest."29
Likewise, Newsweek Magazine proclaimed that it was the
"Age of Ecology," a time during which we were making
important discoveries about the "web of life.""o Capping
decades of growing environmental awareness, the first Earth
Day was celebrated on April 22, 1970.'
The Elu ie Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity 33 ENVTL. L. 29,
46 (2003) (discussing Congressional intent behind the CW); Michael C.
Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Nor Taken: EPA s. Clean Water, 33 EN-
VTL. L. 79 (2003) (discussing landmark cases in which EPA evaded the CWks
fundamental objective).
21. See Adler, supra note 20, at 32.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at '6 (1972) (emphasis added). The report continues,
"[a]Ithough man is a 'part of nature' and a product of evolution, 'natural' is
generally defined as that condition in existence before the activities of man in-
voked perturbations which prevented the system from returning to its original
state of equilibrium." Id.
23. CWX § 502(19), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2006).
24. See BETTY JEAN CRAIGE, EUGENE ODUM: ECOSYSTEM ECOLOGIST AND ENvi-
RONMENTALIST Xi xii (2002).
25. See Klein, supa note 20, at 1036.
26. Id. (quoting ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH EssAYs ON
CONSERVATION FROM RoUND RIVER 239 (1953)).
27. Id
28. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 20-23 (25th anniversary ed. 1987); see
abo id. at 7 (asserting that almost five hundred new chemicals were used in the
United States each year, many created "for use in killing insects, weeds, rodents,
and other organisms described in the modern vernacular as 'pests .... ").
29. CRAIGE, supra note 24, at xii.
30 Id.
31. Id
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Although broad ecosystem awareness undergirds the
CWA, Congress chose to carry out its sweeping goals through
a compartmentalized approach.3 2 As a result, although the
statutory purpose pays homage to the function of aquatic
ecosystems, in practice, important decisions turn on nar-
row linguistic interpretations of individual words, includ-
ing "addition," "navigable," "point source, "pollution," and
"fill."'3 The next section dissects compartments of the CWA,
setting the stage for Part II's discussion of the motivating
factors that may have prompted the segmentation impulse.
B. The Compartmentalizing Impulse
One can envision Congress separating water droplets into a
series of regulatory boxes as it drafted the CWA. The stat-
ute's first line of defense protects a specific type of water-
"navigable" surface waters. Further, it protects those waters
from a specific type of harm-the degradation of quality
caused by the addition of pollutants from point sources.34
In addition to creating this new pollution control program
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), 5 the CWA incorporates a second regulatory
scheme that draws on the historic authority of the Army
Corps of Engineers to regulate the deposit of "dredge and
fill" materials into the nation's waters. 6 The CWA gives less
or no attention to the protection of other types of waterbod-
ies (including non-navigable waters and groundwater) and
other types of activities (including water diversions, wetland
draining, and pollution through diffuse runoff). As con-
sidered in Part III, there are good reasons why Congress
took such a compartmentalized approach, including ratio-
nales supplied by political theory and cognitive psychology.
As illustrated in Part IV, however, the compartmentalized
thinking of the CWA can lead to what psychologists refer
to as "cognitive illusions."
The CWA's statutory scheme can be illustrated with a
decision tree that shows whether or not CWA jurisdiction
extends to a particular activity or water body.f In the deci-
sion tree, a series of boxes represents important decisions
that determine whether the CWA can regulate activities
that threaten aquatic integrity.' This jurisdictional maze
tracks the text of the statute, which requires a permit for
the "discharge of any pollutant."" Congress defined that all-
important jurisdictional threshold as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.'4 0 As
explained in the text below and illustrated in Figure 1, the
32. See infa Part I.B.
33. See infr Part I.B.
34. See generally Summary of the Clean Yater Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.govilawsregs/laws/cwa.htmi (last updated Aug. 23, 2012).
35. See infa Part I.B.5 (discussing the section 402 program).
36. See infr Part I.B.5 (discussing the section 404 program).
37. See infa Figure 1.
38. In Figure 1, the top row lists waterbodies and activities subject to the CWA,
and the bottom row lists waterbodies and activities not regulated under the
CWA or those that receive secondary attention. Although the discharge of
"fill" material is regulated under the Act, in certain cases it may receive more
lenient treatment than the discharge of pollutarnts. See inf Part III.B.
39. CWN § 30 1(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
40. Id. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006).
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statute regulates water quality (but does not allocate specific
quantities to particular water users), the addition of pollut-
ants (but not the subtraction of water, which may have the
same result, as in the case of draining wetlands), and the
deposit into navigable (but not non-navigable) waters, from
a point source (but not from diffuse runoff, for example).
In addition, during legislative negotiations, Congress modi-
fied a bill that would have protected both watercourses and
wetlands under a single permitting program, resulting in the
two distinct regulatory programs.
U U U U
Figure I
I. Water Quality v. Water Quantity
The boxes. The CWA has been hailed as an example of
cooperative federalism, with its careful delineation of roles
for both state and federal governments.41 Section 101 pro-
claims that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recog-
nize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollu-
tion . . . ."42 Other sections of the law amplify this theme
of federal and state cooperation. Section 402, for example,
establishes a permit system for the discharge of pollutants,
first granting permitting authority to the EPA Administra-
tor, and then setting forth procedures for the approval of
state permit programs.
Beyond this sharing of authority to regulate water qual-
ity, the Act carves out a province related to water quantity
solely within the jurisdiction of the states: the allocation
of water rights.44 Section 101(g) assures the states that
"i[t] is the policy of Congress that the authority of each
State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction
shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired
by this chapter."
The background. Just as the CWA does not federally regu-
late water allocation, state water allocation laws, for the most
part, do not regulate pollution.4' For more than a century
before the passage of the 1972 CWA, states had been allo-
cating the right to use water within their jurisdictions.47 In
the eastern states, the early "natural flow" doctrine entitled
41. See, e.g., CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (delegating the role of
running the construction grants program to the states).
42 Id.
43. CWA § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006) (establishing national pollutant
discharge elimination system).
44. CWA § 101(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
45. See id
46. See generally Anne W Squier, YV ater Quality YVater Quantity: The Reluctant
Alarriage, 21 ENVTL. L. 1081, 1082-83 (1991) (noting the propensity of
western water interests [to view] the prior appropriation doctrine as creating
legal claims unrelated to water quality considerations," but noting that such
view "is not shared by economists, by municipalities, by Indian nations, by
EPA, or by environmentalists").
47. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 141-42 (Cal. 1855) (applying prior ap-
propriation doctrine in California).
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waterfront landowners to make use of the adjacent stream,
but only to the extent that such use would not diminish the
quantity of the natural flow or impair its quality. In most
eastern states, this restrictive doctrine proved unworkable9
and gave way to the "reasonable use" doctrine, which gov-
erns the type and volume of permissible water use, but does
not directly regulate water pollution. 0 Likewise, the water
law of the western states gives scant, if any, attention to mat-
ters of water quality.5'
The challenges. The traditional bifurcation of water qual-
ity and water quantity makes little hydrologic sense. The
purported distinction poses numerous challenges, including
the question of whether water diversions should be discour-
aged in order to maintain higher volume flows capable of
assimilating pollution-an inexpensive, but limited, method
of pollution control sometimes described as "pollution
dilution."2 As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserted in the
context of a dispute under section 401 of the CWA, however,
"[t]his is an artificial distinction. In many cases ... a suffi-
cient lowering of the water quantity in a body of water could
destroy all of its designated uses, be it for drinking water,
recreation, navigation or . .. as a fishery."53
The quality/quantity distinction goes to the heart of
the CWA's cooperative federalism scheme.5 But for all its
importance, the distinction is surprisingly difficult to dis-
cern in practice. As considered in the next section, this
critical determination turns on the interpretation of a single
word-addition.
2. Addition v. Subtraction
The boxes. The Act's core prohibition against unregulated
pollution is expressed in section 301.56 That provision aims
squarely at "the discharge of any pollutant."17 That phrase, in
turn, means "any addition of any pollutant" into protected
48. See Robert H. Abrams, Ch5arting the Course ofRiparianism: An Instrumental-
is Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1381, 1392 (1989) ("Natural flow
riparianism required that water be left to flow down to each lot owner, 'undi-
minished as to quantity and quality."'); see also Harrell v. Conway, 271 S.W2d
924, 926-27 (Ark. 1954) (discussing the natural flow doctrine).
49. See Abrams, supra note 48, at 1392-93.
50. Conway, 271 S.W.2d at 926 (discussing the "reasonable use" doctrine under
which "each landowner is entitled to make any reasonable use of the water,
provided that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the beneficial use
of the stream by others").
51. See generally Squier, supra note 46, at 1082-83 (noting that the "western water
interests have viewed the prior appropriation doctrine as creating legal claims
unrelated to water quality considerations.").
52. Id. at 1083; see also Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. U.S. Entl. Prot. Agency,
836 F.2d 1482, 1488-89 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Congress explicitly recognized that
reduction of the amount of effluents-not merely their dilution or disper-
sion-is the goal of the CWA.").
53. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dept of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994) (upholding
states' authority under CWA section 401 to condition state certification of
hydroelectric power plant on the maintenance of minimum stream flow con-
ditions, even though the requirement is not a water quality limitation related
specifically to a discharge); CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
54. See CW 1 01(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006).
55. See infl Part I.B.2.
56. CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
57. See id
41
waters. 5 The word "addition" is not defined by statute or
agency regulation.
The background. When Congress tackled the problem of
water pollution, it used the word "discharge" as a shorthand
description of the types of undesirable behavior it wished to
target. 60 This single-minded focus on acts of discharge cre-
ates tension with the CWA's results-oriented objective-to
restore and maintain aquatic integrity and the functional-
ity of ecosystems. 61 In most cases, the tension is resolved
by treating the statutory goal as mere aspiration, and dis-
charge as the operational trigger for regulation.62 Thus,
in the absence of an action that fits the definition of "dis-
charge," agencies and the courts will tolerate the destruction
of aquatic resources, or at least cast them as outside the scope
of federal regulation.63
The challenges. A variety of activities may result in the
impairment of water quality, but the challenge is to deter-
mine whether or not the activity constitutes an "addition."6 '
Courts have struggled with related questions, including
whether the term encompasses: (1) the artificial movement of
polluted water from one place to another (water transfers);65
(2) the removal of pollutants followed by the addition of
those same pollutants (redeposit);66 and (3) the removal of
water from wetlands when the result is the functional equiv-
alent of filling them in (draining).?
Hard cases arise where a pipe, pump, or other artificial
structure moves water from a polluted waterbody to an area
of relatively clean water.6' Does that constitute pollution
that the CWA can regulate as an "addition"? Alternatively,
such movement of water might constitute a water "transfer"
rather than an "addition"-the type of activity routinely
addressed by state water allocation law.69 The federal circuit
courts resolved that ambiguity, generally in favor of fed-
eral regulation./0 For example, in a dispute that reached the
58. CWA § 501(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006) (emphasis added) (defining
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source . . .").
59. Blumm & Warnock, supa note 20, at 88; see abo Catskill Mountains Chapter
of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 E 3d 481, 486 (2d Cir.
2001) (recognizing that the act does not define "addition.").
60. See U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-297, WATERS AND WET-
LANDS: CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS DISTRICT OFFICE PRAC-
TICES IN DETERMINING JURISDICTION 4 (2004).
61. See CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006); see abo Adler, supra note 20,
at 47 (Congress may have lost the distinction between "pollutant" and "pollu-
tion" because "EPA and state implementation of the Act had focused almost
entirely on the discharge of pollutants, and very little on broader sources of
water pollution"); Blumm & Warnock, supra note 20, at 107-09 (discuss-
ing landmark cases in which EPA evaded the Clean Water Act's fundamental
objective).
62. Adler, supra note 20, at 34-47.
63. See id. at 32-3'.
64. See Klein, supa note 20, at 1022.
65. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 E3d 1364,
1367 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated& remanded, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
66. Blumm & Warnock, supra note 20, at 88 n.56, 89 Miccosukee 7ibe oflnds,
280 F3d at 1368.
6'. See Blumm & Warnock, supra note 20, at 88 n.56, 88-89.
68. See Klein, supra note 20, at 1032-35.
69. See Christine A. Klein, Water Transfers. The Case Against Thrnsbasin Diversions
in th Eastern States, 25 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL y 249, 260-61 (2007).
70. Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 E3d 1273, 1297, 1299 (1st Cir. 1996)
(holding where "the discharge is through a point source and the intake water
contains pollutants, an NPDES permit is required"); see also Catskill Moun-
Winter 2013
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First Circuit Court of Appeals, a New Hampshire ski resort
pumped water from a polluted river through its snowmaking
pipes, and then discharged the excess into a pristine pond
high in the White Mountains.' Because the transfer of pol-
luted water into the pond "would not occur naturally" and
because the source and receiving waters were "distinct," the
court held that the transfer was an addition of pollutants
that required a CWA permit.
Likewise, the Second Circuit determined that New York
City needed a federal permit for the operation of its drink-
ing water system, which transmits pure water through pipes
from the upstate Catskill Mountains.7 In moving water
around through natural and artificial structures, the City
introduced silt and clay into a clear stream renowned for
its trout fishery. '4 The Second Circuit concluded that such
water transfers required a CWA permit because they intro-
duced pollutants from "any place outside" the receiving
water body.
Developing a slightly different test, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the transfer of already-polluted water into clean
water constitutes the addition of a pollutant whenever "a
point source is the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants
into navigable waters." Conversely, departing from the fed-
eral courts' willingness to find CWA jurisdiction over water
transfers, a 2008 EPA regulation determined that the CWA
does not authorize the regulation of water transfers, which
are defined as "an activity that conveys or connects waters
of the United States without subjecting the transferred water
to intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use."n
Subsequent to these opinions by the First, Second, and Elev-
enth Circuits supporting regulatory jurisdiction, however,
EPA enacted a rule that provided a more limited interpreta-
tion of its own authority./-
A second challenging issue arises when materials are suc-
cessively removed from, and then "redeposited" into, juris-
dictional waters. This sequence of events can take place, for
example, when a developer excavates and levels a wetland to
prepare it for construction or cultivation, but the developer
permits more than a trivial amount of the excavated material
(defined as a pollutant under CWA section 502 after removal
from its original source) to fall back onto the land.,"
tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 Ed 481,
484-85, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that an NPDES permit is required for
any "transfer of water containing pollutants from one body of water to another,
distinct body ofwater").
'1. Dubois, 102 E3d at 12'7-78.
72. Id. at 1299 (holding where "the discharge is through a point source and the
intake water contains pollutants, an NPDES permit is required").
73. Catskill Mountains Chapter of7o ut Unlimited, 273 F.3d at 489-93. See gener-
ally Klein, supir note 20, at 1028-31 (discussing the Second Circuits decision
in Catsk/ Mountains Chapter ofrot Uniinted).
-4. Catskill.Vountin Chapter of Trout Unlmited 23 E3d at 484-85.
75. Id. at 491.
'6. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 E3d 1364,
1368 (1 th Cir. 2002), vacated& remande, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
7. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systern (NPDES) Water Transfers
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33704 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.ER.
Pt. 122), upheld, Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570
F.3d 1210, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 643 (2010).
'8. See U.S. GCovT AccounTuBIFY OFFICE, supra note 60, at 2-3.
79. CWk § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006) (defining "pollutant" as includ-
ing, inter alia, dredged spoil, rock, and sand).
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In one prominent case, landowners cleared 20,000 acres
of forested wetlands using a bulldozer with a special blade
that sheared off trees and vegetation at ground level." Next,
they raked the trees into rows, burned them, mixed the
stumps and ashes into the ground, and then dug a ditch
to drain the wetland so that it could be planted with soy-
beans." When a plaintiff group sought to enjoin the defen-
dants from additional clearing without a CWA permit, the
reviewing court agreed with the plaintiffs.- On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction, and noted that the land
clearing activities also involved the "redeposit" of materials,
including logs and vegetation, that would not burn.83 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that "the term 'discharge' covers the
redepositing of materials taken from the wetlands "4 par-
ticularly under the facts of the case where "the landowners'
redepositing activities would significantly alter the charac-
ter of the wetlands and limit the vital ecological functions
served by the tract."8 5
Courts, however, draw the line where redeposits are so
small in volume, and redeposited so close to their original
location, that they comprise what is known as "incidental
fallback."'1 In such cases, according to the D.C. Circuit,
"the straightforward statutory term 'addition' cannot rea-
sonably be said to encompass the situation in which mate-
rial is removed from the waters of the United States and a
small portion of it happens to fall back."' Such incidental
fallback, the court reasoned, "represents a net withdrawal,
not an addition, of material" and cannot be considered to be
a discharge that triggers CWA jurisdiction." Subsequently,
the Army Corps of Engineers, which implements the dredge
and fill permit program, amended its regulatory definition
of "discharge of dredged material" to exclude incidental fall-
back." Beyond that narrow concession to the D.C. Circuit,
however, the regulation explicitly maintained regulatory
authority over "any addition of dredged material ... includ-
ing redeposit of dredged material other than incidental
fallback. . ."
The removal of wetland materials, unaccompanied by
redeposit, poses yet another interpretative challenge. Sup-
pose a landowner destroys the functionality of a wetland by
draining it. Should that be treated the same as the filling of a
wetland with soil, an activity that is clearly regulated under
the CWA?' That question has rarely been addressed, but
80. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 E2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.
1983).
81. Id.
82. Avoyelles Sportsren's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 E Supp. 278, 292 (WD.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
La. 198 1) aff d in part,_rev'din part sub nom. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc.
v. Marsh, '15 E2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983)
Avoyelle Sportsmenk League, 715 E2d at 923.
Id.
Id.
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Arny Corps of Eng'rs, 145 E3d 1399, 1405 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1404.
88. Id.
89. Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 64 Fed. Reg. 25120, 25120-21 (May 10, 1999) (codified
at 33 C.FR. pt. 323, 40 C.ER. pt. 232).
90. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1) (2012).
91. See infla Part I.B.5.
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the limited case law treats draining as the "mere removal" of
water, rather than as the equivalent of filling.92 As a result,
the draining of wetlands remains unregulated, creating a
loophole in the protective net of the CWA.
3. Navigable v. Non-Navigable
The boxes. The CWA limits its regulation of pollutants to
those that are discharged into "navigable waters." 9 Sec-
tion 502 defines navigable waters to mean "the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.""
The background. The CWA's inclusion of the term "navi-
gable" hearkens back to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
(also known as the Refuse Act), which sought to keep the
nation's navigational channels free from refuse and other
impediments." Before the passage of the CWA, federal
officials pressed the old Refuse Act into service as a pollu-
tion control statute. In the CWA, a draft of section 502
defined navigable waters as "the navigable waters of the
United States," but struck out the word "navigable" before
the provision was enacted into law." The Conference Report
stated that the term "navigable waters" should be given "the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencum-
bered by agency determinations which have been made or
may be made for administrative purposes."" It is widely
accepted that the CWA covers waters that are used, or sus-
ceptible to use, in interstate or foreign commerce, as well as
interstate waters and wetlands. 00 But beyond that, the courts
and federal agencies have struggled for decades to delineate
the jurisdictional scope of "navigable waters," particularly in
the context of wetlands and so-called isolated waterbodies.0 o
The courts have also struggled to determine whether the Act
regulates groundwater.102
92. See infla Part III.A.
93. OFFICE oF TECi. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., NTIS ORDER No. PB84-175918,
WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION 168 (1984), available at http://gov-
info.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_4/DATA/1984/8433.pdf
94. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006).
95. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
96. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 40' (2006).
97. See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203
(1976) (explaining that "to strengthen the [pollution] abatement system fed-
eral officials revived the Refuse Act of 1899, which prohibits the discharge of
any matter into the Nation's navigable waters except with a federal permit").
98. See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATU-
RAL RESOURCES LAw: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 958-60
(2d ed. 2009); see also S. REP. No. 92 -1236 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 376, 3821 (emphasis added) (amending the definition
of "navigable waters" and providing, "[t]he term 'navigable waters' means the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas").
99. S. REP. No. 92-1236, reprintedin 1972 U.S. C.C.A.N., at 3821.
100. See 33 C.FR. § 328.3(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (defining "waters" of the United
States).
101. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANNQ, 531 U.S. 159, 168-73 (2001) (discussing congressional and reg-
ulatory jurisdictional provisions and declining to hold that isolated ponds fall
under § 404(a) s definition of "navigable waters" because they serve as habitat
for migratory birds).
102. see, e.g., Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Idaho
2001) (recognizing jurisdiction over groundwater, but only if it is hydrological-
lv connected to surface water); Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co.,
870 E Supp. 983, 989-91 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (noting that discharges that ri-
grate through groundwater constitute "discharges of pollutants into navigable
waters" within the meaning of the CWA).
The challenges. In an early interpretation of the CWA,
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted "navigable waters"
broadly in order to protect the functioning of aquatic eco-
systems. 0 In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
the Court supported the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction
over wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters and their
tributaries.10 Although the Court acknowledged that, "[o]
na purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to
classify 'lands,' wet or otherwise, as 'waters," it concluded
that in order to determine the limits of its jurisdiction, "the
Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water
ends and land begins." 105
Sixteen years later, the Court took up a question left
openo6 by Riverside Bayview Homes-whether the Corps'
regulatory authority extends to "wetlands that are not adja-
cent to bodies of open water." 0 Retreating from Riverside'
generous jurisdictional interpretation, Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U S. Army Corps of Engineers
("SWA NCC") struck down a regulation of intrastate waters
"[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by ... migratory
birds which cross state lines .... "' In an attempt to recon-
cile Riverside and SWANCC, the Court asserted,
We said in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word 'navi-
gable' in the statute was of 'limited import'. . . and went
on to hold that § 404(a) extended to nonnavigable wet-
lands adjacent to open waters. But it is one thing to give
a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect
whatever. The term "navigable" has at least the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for
enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could rea-
sonably be so made.
In 2006, the Supreme Court took up the jurisdictional
question yet again."o In Rapanos v. United States, the Court
invalidated the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands
located at least eleven miles from the nearest navigable water-
course."' In a fragmented decision, a four-justice plurality
held that the CWA regulates wetlands only if they are (1)
adjacent to a "relatively permanent body of water connected
to traditional interstate navigable waters" and (2) have a
"continuous surface connection with that water, making it
difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wet-
land' begins."112 In concurrence, Justice Kennedy asserted
that wetlands fall within the Act's jurisdiction if they pos-
103. United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985)
(upholding unanimously Corps' regulations asserting jurisdiction over wet-
lands adjacent to navigable waters).
104. Id. at 132.
105. Id.
106. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWAiNCC), 531 U.S. 159, 159-60 (2001) (striking the Corps' so-called
Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 4121' (1986)).
107. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
108. SU4NCC, 531 U.S. at 164.
109. Id. at 172.
110. Rapantos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730 (2006).
111. Id. at 720, 757.
112. Id. at 742.
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sess a "significant nexus" to traditional navigable waters."'
Linking the nexus requirement closely to the statute's goal
of integrity, he explained, "wetlands possess the requisite
nexus ... if [they] ... significantly affect the chemical, phys-
ical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as 'navigable.'"" The remaining four jus-
tices dissented. They asserted that wetlands fall within the
CWA's jurisdiction if they satisfy either the test articulated
by the plurality or the test set forth by Justice Kennedy."'
In 2007, EPA issued a jurisdictional guidance docu-
ment."' In contrast to the Rapanos plurality, the document
claimed potential jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands-
including those without a continuous surface connection to
open waters" -provided that fact-specific analyses revealed
that such wetlands possess a "significant nexus" with tradi-
tional navigable waters."' Thus, as Justice Roberts predicted
in a separate concurrence, "[i]t is unfortunate that no opin-
ion commands a majority of the Court .... Lower courts
and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a
case-by-case basis."
4. Point Source v. Nonpoint Source Pollution
The boxes. Section 502(12) limits the CWA's reach to pollut-
ants discharged through a "point source,"120 which the Act
defines as "any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
[or] tunnel . . . ."1 Nonpoint sources are generally unregu-
lated by the CWA.122 The definition of "point source" spe-
cifically excludes "agricultural stormwater discharges and
return flows from irrigated agriculture."123 In 1987, Congress
amended the statement of goals to mention nonpoint source
pollution: "it is the national policy that programs for the
control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and
implemented in an expeditious manner . . . . "4 Congress
left the realization of that goal, however, to the states-to be
addressed primarily through the development of best man-
agement practices.125
113. d. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 780.
115. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEPT OF THE ARMY, CLEAN WATER ACT JU-
RISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RAPANOS V.
UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at http://wa-
ter.epa.gov/lawvsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2008_12_3_wetlandsCW"A
JurisdictionFollowingRapanosl20208.pdf.
117. Al. at 4.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Rapanos v. United States, 54' U.S. '15, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
120. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006).
121. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
122. See, e.g., Ronald L. Glicsman & Matthew R. Batzel, ie, Politics, Law, and
the Arc ofthe Clean Ylater Act: he Role ofAssumptions in the Adoption ofa Pol-
l1tion Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 99, 115-16 (2010) (dis-
cussing Congress' decision making process behind excluding nonpoint sources
from mandatory federal regulation).
123. Id.
124. Water Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 100 Stat. 7, 60 (1987) (codified as
amended at CWA. § 10 1(a)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1251a)( 7)).
125. See CWA § 319, 33 U.S .C. 1329(a)(1)(C) (2006) (calling on states to devel-
op best management practices to reduce pollutant loads from nonpoint sources
causing violations of water quality standards); see abo CWA § 208, 33 U.S.C.
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The background. To address water pollution, Con-
gress reached first for the low-hanging fruit: industrial and
municipal point source polluters.12 6 These polluters were
undoubtedly foremost in the congressional consciousness 1 27
especially when considering that just three years before the
passage of the 1972 CWA, oil and chemical pollution in
Cleveland's Cuyahoga River reached such levels that the
river itself burst into flames. 128 As the Second Circuit noted,
"[t]his emphasis was sensible, as '[i]ndustrial and municipal
point sources were the worst and most obvious offenders of
surface water quality. They were also the easiest to address
because their loadings emerge from a discrete point such as
the end of a pipe.'"l29
The challenges. Forty years after the passage of the CWA,
agricultural and urban runoff remain among the most
intractable, and important, unaddressed sources of pollu-
tion.130 On the eve of the CWA's twenty-fifth anniversary
in 1997, EPA asserted that although the nation had made
impressive advances in controlling pollution discharged
from factories and sewage treatment plants, the control of
runoff from diffuse nonpoint sources lagged behind."' The
agency explained, "[tioday, nonpoint source (NPS) pollution
remains the Nation's largest source of water quality prob-
lems. It's the main reason that approximately 40 percent of
our surveyed rivers, lakes, and estuaries are not clean enough
to meet basic uses such as fishing or swimming."132 By 2010,
the situation remained serious and EPA described nonpoint
source pollution as the most challenging remaining source of
water pollution.13 3
5. Pollutants v. Fill
The boxes. The CWA establishes two types of permit pro-
grams. First, EPA administers the National Pollutant Dis-
1288(a)(2) 2006) (encouraging the development by the states of "areawide
waste treatment management plans" to identify and address nonpoint source
pollution). See geneally SEN TE COMM. ON ENV'T & PU. WORKS, N\ONPOINT
SOURCE POLLUTION 1ANAGEMENT AcT oF 1983, S. REP. NO. 98-282, at 7
(1983) (leaving states with broad discretion to establish categories of nonpoint
sources and define best management practices).
126. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 122, at 115-16 (arguing that Congress de-
clined to enact mandatory federal regulation of nonpoint sources because
point source pollution was more readily controlled and measured, and because
regulation of nonpoint sources threatened to impinge on the states' traditional
authoritv over land use regulation); see abo United States v. Plaza Health Labs.,
Inc., 3 E3d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the CWA "generally
targets industrial and municipal sources of pollutants").
12'. See Plaza IHealth Labs., 3 E3d at 646.
128. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Celebrates Cuyahoga River 40th
Anniversary (June 22, 2009), avilable at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/ad-
mpress.nsf/0/3246CA6D2C45D3FF852575DD004BB9C2 (describing "the
infamous fire that galvanized the nation's environmental movement").
129. Plaza Hea th Labs., 3 F3d at 646 (quoting David Letson, Point/Nonpoint
SourcePolluion R duction 7ading:An Interpretive Survey, 32 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 21, 221 992)).
130. Ftlands and Runoff U.S. ENVIL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetland/facts/fact25.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2012).
131. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The NVazion" Largest Water Quality Problem, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.govipolwaste/nps/outreach/pointl.
cfm (last updated Aug. 22, 2012).
132. Id.
133. Polluted Runoff (ANnpoint Source Pollution): Basic nformation, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://ivwiv.epa.gov/owvow keepNIPS/whatis.html (last up-
dated Feb. 10, 2010).
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charge Elimination System ("NPDES") of section 402.134
In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers administers the
dredge and fill permit program of section 404,"1 subject
to oversight by the Administrator of EPA.'36 Although sec-
tion 404 is recognized widely as governing the fill of wet-
lands, the CWA does not include the word "wetland" in
its text.'3
The background. During the drafting of the 1972 CWA,
the Senate bill would have included the permitting of dredge
and fill material in the section 402 NPDES program."' An
amendment passed by the House of Representatives, how-
ever, transformed that provision into a separate dredge and
fill permit program to be administered by the Secretary of the
Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers.13 The legisla-
tive history suggests that the new section 404 program was
not aimed at the protection of wetlands.140 Rather, it drew
from the Corps' authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act
to maintain clear passage for waterborne commerce.1" The
Senate Conference Report states that the "Secretary and the
Administrator shall act promptly on dredging permits essen-
tial for the maintenance of interstate commerce because of
the seasonal nature of dredging and the need to preschedule
scarce dredging equipment."14 Beyond maintaining open
channels of commerce, the disposal of dredged material
appeared to be an afterthought.143 As the Conference Report
explained, "[i]t is expected that until such time as feasible
alternative methods for disposal of dredged or fill material
are available, unreasonable restrictions shall not be imposed
on dredging activities essential for the maintenance of inter-
state and foreign commerce."144
The challenges. The section 404 permit program remains
the primary line of defense for the protection of wetlands;
the program, however, seems ill-equipped for the task.145 The
jurisdictional obstacles alone are daunting. The courts have
struggled with the counterintuitive notion that wetlands are
susceptible to regulation as waters of the United States. 1 6
As the Supreme Court acknowledged, "[o]n a purely linguis-
134. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
135. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
136. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
13. Glicksrnan & Batzel, supra note 122, at 117-18 (asserting that "[jiudicial
interpretations of the scope of the program have exacerbated rather than
resolved the ... confusion" that results from the statute's failure to use the
term wetlands).
138. S. REP. NO. 92-1236 (19'2) (Conf. Rep.), repr nted in 19'2 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3776, 3818 (reporting that section 402(m) of the Senate bill included proce-
dures for the issuance of permits for the discharge of dredged spoil).
139. Id. at 3818-19.
140. See id.
141. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 300
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Section 404 hews to the Corps' established
expertise in matters of navigability and construction.").
142. S. REP. No. 92-1236, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3819.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search
ofa Polic, 55 A. L. REv. 607, 635 (2004) (stating that the scope of activities
regulated under section 404 are "inadequate to achieve wetland conservation').
146. See id. at 61'-18 (discussing generally that a limitation on section 404's ef-
fectiveness "is that it seeks to protect wetlands as a category ofwater"), see, e.g,
United States v. Riverside Bayview Hores, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985)
("Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition
from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.").
tic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify 'lands,' wet
or otherwise, as 'waters.'" 147 Further, particularly in cases
involving the disposal of mining byproducts, the courts have
found it difficult to distinguish between the "pollutants"
regulated by EPA and the "fill" material regulated by the
Corps.4, As some Justices of the Supreme Court worry, this
may create a regulatory loophole that threatens to swallow
important CWA protections.14
II. Compartmentalized Thinking
Although the CWA pays homage to the notion of water
integrity, 50 the statute tackles the problem of water pollution
box by hydrologic box. '1 As suggested in the previous dis-
cussion, some of the distinctions can lead to an unnecessar-
ily fragmented and incomplete approach to the protection of
water quality. This juxtaposition of wholeness and atomism
within a single statute can be explained, in part, by political
theory and by cognitive psychology.
A. Political Theory
In a relatively forgotten chapter of environmental history,
President Nixon's administration developed cautious plans to
integrate five environmental programs: air pollution, water
pollution, pesticide management, solid waste and radiation,
and noise control.1 5 Under that plan, the fledgling EPA would
exercise its authority along functional, rather than program-
matic, lines.15 3 That is, regardless of the medium impacted by
pollution (air, water, or land), EPA would channel its efforts
into the tasks of management planning, enforcement of stan-
dards, and research and monitoring. '54 That plan never came
to fruition, however, and today's EPA continues to divide its
authority along media-specific lines.1 5 5
In a similar defeat of environmental integration, some
pollution control statutes contain explicit exemptions from
the duty imposed on federal agencies by the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA") to assess the environmental
impacts of various federal actions. ' 6 As Professor Lakshman
Guruswamy lamented in 1989, such exemptions and other
statutory provisions "overran the integrative thrust of NEPA
and EPA."15 Overall, he argues that the late 196 0s and the
early 1970s witnessed a "dialectic interaction between frag-
147. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132.
148. See Robert B. Moreno, Filling the Regulatory Gap: A Proposal for Restruct
ing the Clean Water Act' Two-Permit System, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285, 299-305
(2010).
149. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 302-03
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. See discussion supra Part I.A.
151. See discussion suprm Part I.B.
152. Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 488 (discussing the planned reorganization of
environmental regulation along functional lines).
153. See id. at 476-77 (discussing the establishment of EPA in 1970).
154. Al. at 488.
155. Id. at 489-90 (discussing EP's "virtual rejection of an integrated approacl').
156. Al. at 47-78 (discussing express statutory exemptions under the Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act).
157. Al. at 476.
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mentation and integration" and "fragmentation emerged as
the more powerful policy stream."15-
What can account for the segmentation of the CWA
and other modern pollution control statutes? At least three
aspects of political theory can explain such a result. First, the
1972 CWA reflects the historical baggage of the New Deal
era."' During Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency, Congress
enacted numerous laws designed to rescue the nation from
the Great Depression. 6 o In its 1936 opinion, Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act and held that it exceeded the
scope of the Commerce Clause. 6' After, tensions escalated
between the executive and judicial branches over the appro-
priate scope of the constitutional commerce power. In 1937,
the Court backed away from its narrow view in National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones 6- Laughlin Steel Corp., 6
thereby paving the way for the President to suggest, and Con-
gress to enact, broad-ranging legislation aimed at helping the
nation emerge from the depression. The Court continued to
permit an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause
until well after the 1972 passage of the CWA. 61
But this expansive view of federal authority was not
unlimited. As a counterweight to broad legislative action, the
Court insisted, under the so-called nondelegation doctrine,
that Congress retain final control over broad delegations of
legislative authority to the executive branch. 64 The co-equal
branches of government soon reached an accommodation:
the Court would not invalidate legislation, even if it dele-
gated vast authority to executive branch agencies, as long as
Congress articulated an "intelligible principle" to limit the
exercise of agency discretion. 65
As a result of such unsettling constitutional debates and
the practical limitations imposed by the nondelegation doc-
trine, Congress may have been discouraged from passing
broad, non-compartmentalized legislation that would have
regulated water, air, and land pollution under a unified,
holistic regime. As Professor Guruswamy posits,
158. d.
159. See id. at 480-82.
160. President Roosevelt, the thirty-second President of the United States, served
from 1933-45. Franklin D. Roosevcl, TIH WHITE HOUSE, ittp://Whwv.white-
house.gov/about/presidents/franklindroosevelt (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
161. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 239 (1936). The Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935, sought, among other things, to regulate the indus-
try in the name of the national public interest. Id. at 278; see Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 § 1, Pub. L. '4-402, 49 Stat. 991, 991 (1935).
162. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 2
(1937) (upholding against Commerce Clause challenge the National Labor
Relations Act).
163. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-58, 567-68 (1995) (striking as
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990).
164. See Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935) (striking a provi-
sion of the National Industrial Recovery Act as delegating to the President leg-
islative discretion unconstrained by congressional control); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 495 (1935) (striking down the national
Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional under the Nondelegation Doctrine
and Commerce Clause).
165. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (reversing appellate
courts invalidation under the Nondelegation Doctrine of National Ambient
Air Quality Standards set by EPA for ozone and particulate matter section).
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serious doubts about whether the New Deal belief in
independent and expert administrative agencies could
creatively regulate a complex social problem in the public
interest affected the approaches taken to environmental
problems. . . . An integrated approach [to pollution con-
trol] called for a broad delegation of power. Arguments for
integration based on ecological thinking, however, were
countered by others which resisted the granting of wide
discretionary power.166
The federal environmental legislation that emerged later
in the century took a segmented, media-specific approach. In
response to doubts about agencies' ability to regulate pollu-
tion, statutes articulated specific mandates, obligations, and
deadlines to guide agency discretion. 67
Beyond the reaction against the idealism of the New Deal
era, sheer pragmatism may have dictated the compartmen-
talized approach of the CWA and contemporaneous legisla-
tion. 8 As one scholar argued, "precisely because everything
is interconnected, the environmental problem is beyond our
capacity to control in one unified policy. The very enormity
of the interconnected environment makes it impossible to
treat it as a whole."'16' As an early response to complexity,
some political theorists called for "incrementalism"'1o and
"muddling through" complex problems piece by piece.'
The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts took this cautious, step-
by-step approach through provisions that regulated pollution
medium by medium, pollutant by pollutant, pipe by pipe.1 2
Later in the century, incrementalism would be supplemented
by the more holistic strategy of adaptive management.'3 But
166. Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 480.
167. Id. at 476.
168. See id. at 482-83 (discussing "New Deal dissatisfaction with expert solutions
to complicated problems").
169. Id. at 482-84 (recounting doubts expressed by Charles Lindblom in 1973).
See generdly Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of' "Vuddizng Through, 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79, 84-85 (1959) (explaining that is "impossible to take every-
thing important into consideration unless 'important is so narrowly defined
that analysis is in fact quite limited").
170. Guruswxamy, supea note 10, at 482-84; see also Lindblom, supra note 169, at
84-85 ("every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex problem must
find ways to drastically simplify"). See generdly HANS BLOKLAND, PURALIsM,
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: ROBERT A. DAHL AND His CRITICS
ON MODERN POLITICS 6 (2011) (explaining that Dahl and Lindblom identi-
fled incrementalism-the process ofinvestigating alternatives that only deviate
slightly from each other- as a way to rationally evaluate alternatives in the face
of scarcity).
171. See Guruswamy. supra note 10, at 482-84.
172. See g ,eneay J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Chane, Dead Zones, and
Alassive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guid for Wt tiling Away,
98 CALIF. L. REv. 59, 97-98 (2010) [hereinafter Rul & Salzman, Climate
Change] (discussing the late 197Os origins of adaptive management which
placed a premium on "collecting information, establishing measurements of
success, monitorimg outcomes, using new information to adjust existing ap-
proaches, and possessing a willingness to change").
173. Holly Doremus, AdaptiveALnagemen[tas an Inforion Problem, 89 N.C. L.
REv. 1455, 1455 (2011) (arguing that "enthusiasm for adaptive management
has outrun evaluation of its usefulness" and that it should be used as a natural
resource management tool "only when it promises to improve management
outcomes sufficiently to justify the additional costs it imposes"); see also J.B.
Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN.
L. REv. 424, 426 (2010) ("At each step forward in the emergence of adaptive
management something has been lost in the translation. The end product is
something we call 'a/m-lite,' a watered-down version of the theory that resem-
bles ad hoc contingency planning more than it does planned 'learning while
doing.'); Ruhl & Salzman, Climate Change, supra note 172, at 66-6- (consid-
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by then, the segmented approach of the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts would have been firmly established.
Congressional and presidential politics also influenced
the structure of the CWA.' To a powerful degree, indi-
vidual personalities and rivalries from nearly a half-century
ago continue to circumscribe the modern approach to pollu-
tion.5 In the 1960s, Senator Edmund Muskie, chair of the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution Control within
the Senate Public Works Committee, played a prominent
role in drafting legislation that pre-dated the modern Clean
Water and Clean Air Acts.',£ When early legislative attempts
began to fail, it threatened his aspiration to become the
Democratic nominee to challenge President Nixon's reelec-
tion bid in 1972.m As some have suggested, Senator Muskie
likely tailored his proposals so that their drafting and pre-
sentation to Congress would remain entirely within the con-
trol of his subcommittee. The ambitious bill that emerged
from Muskie's subcommittee to become the Clean Air Act
of 1970"" divided the air pollution problem into a number
of categories, including ambient and emission standards,' 1 9
new source emissionsiso and motor vehicle emissions."'
Soon thereafter, Muskie's subcommittee adapted aspects of
the compartmentalized template of the CAA as it drafted
the bill that would become the CWA of 1972.182 With both
proposals, Muskie resisted attempts to broaden them to fit
within an integrated environmental framework because
political authority over such proposals would be shared
with the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (which
drafted the bill that led to the NEPA)."' To this day, most
actions under the Clean Air Act 8 4 and the CWA'8 5 remain
exempt from the holistic approach of NEPA.
ering strategies for whittling away at massive problems and arguing that "agen-
cies whittling away at massive problems must be empowered to pool resources
with other similarly charged agencies in loosely linked weak ties' networks that
connect both institutions and people within the institutions").
174. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 484-87 (describing to competition
between President Nixon and Senator Muskie for credit for legislation that
would assure "the public of a cleaner world.").
175. See id
176. See Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 484-87.
17'. See id. Richard M. Nixon was elected President in 1968 and reelected in 1972.
Richard M. Nixon, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://ivv.whitehouse.goviabout/
presidents/richardnixon (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). Senator Edmund Muskie
unsuccessful sought the Democratic Party nomination in 1972. Edmund
Auskie, U.S. SENATE, http://my .senate.gov/artandhistory/history /common/
image/ME MuskieEdmund 1972.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
178. Clean Air Act ("CAA") of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-515 (2006)).
179. CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006).
180. CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
181. CAA § 17, 42 U.S.C. § '50' (2006),
182. Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 476, 484-87 (describing the central role played
by Sen. Muskie in developing environmental legislation including the Clean
Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972).
183. Id.
184. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 § 7(c), 15
U.S.C. § '93(c) (2006) ("No action taken under the Clean Air Act ... shall be
deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of
169.").
185. CWA § 511(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 13 1(c)(1) (2006) (asserting that, with certain
specified exceptions, "no action ... taken pursuant to this chapter shall be
deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1979").
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B. Cognitive Psychology
Humans have developed cognitive tools to navigate the com-
plicated, information-laden, fast-paced modern world.16 As
scholars have noted, the "complexity of many tasks exceeds
the brain's capacity to process information," a situation that
calls for adaptive strategies to use "scarce cognitive resources
efficiently.""7 The members of Congress likely benefitted
from such tools, particularly as they took on the potentially
overwhelming goal of managing the air, water, and land pol-
lution generated by an increasingly industrialized society.'88
This section examines two cognitive tools that may be par-
ticularly helpful in explaining why Congress took a compart-
mentalized approach to the elimination of water pollution.
I. Schema
Cognitive psychologists tell us that humans make sense of
their world with the help of organizing principles known as
"schema."' These schema assist us, for example, in separat-
ing relevant from irrelevant information when we make deci-
sions!"o The sorting impulse may have prompted Congress to
pour the nation's waters into a succession of analytical boxes.
The top-level boxes attracted the most statutory muscle,
which took aim at additions, navigable waters, point sources,
and pollutants.m' In contrast, Congress relegated removal,
diffuse runoff isolated ponds and wetlands, andfill material to
second-tier status, assigning them lesser importance, at least
for purposes of federal regulation.1 92
2. Heuristics
A second set of cognitive tools, known as "heuristics," pro-
vide reflexive, default "rules of thumb" that enable humans
to process information rapidly.'" The so-called availability
heuristic'" may be particularly relevant to environmental
decision-making and lawmaking. This cognitive habit ampli-
fies the importance of information that is well-known and
familiar to the subject.'" For example, in the years leading
up to the passage of the 1972 CWA, the plight of the flaming
186. See Jeffrey Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optiml Go'-
enment Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 555 (2002).
187. Al at 555; see abo JAMEs SALZMAN& BARTON H. THOMPSON JR., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AND POLICY 24-26 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the cognitive limitations
and biases that effect how humans assess the environment and environmental
policy).
188. Seegenerally Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 186, at 555-58 (discussing strate-
gies that humans use to process information).
189. 1. at 555.
190. Id. at 555-56.
191. These elements are regulated under the federal Clean Water Act. See Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
192. These elements are not regulated under the Clean Water Act. See supla Part
I.B.
193. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 186, at 555.
194. Id. at 556 (asserting that "when making judgments about the frequency of
events, people often rely on the ease with which an instance of a target event
can be called to mind").
195. See id.
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Cuyahoga River was widely publicized. 96 As a result, when
lawmakers turned their attention to the abatement of water
pollution, they likely conjured up the images of burning riv-
ers and industrial pollution that had been seared into the
public consciousness.' This, perhaps, motivated Congress
to target end-of-the-pipe pollution and sewage, rather than
less visible forms of pollution (such as groundwater contami-
nation), through the CWA.98
III. The Cognitive Illusions of the Clean
Water Act
Despite the importance of schema, heuristics, and other
cognitive tools, they can also lead to over-generalizations,
unexamined conclusions, and pervasive errors-known as
"cognitive illusions."'" In the words of one scholar, "our
cognitive limitations inhibit us from grasping completely
the seamless whole of environmental law."200 Cognitive illu-
sions can also permeate media-specific thinking, such as that
reflected by the CWA.20' Two potential cognitive illusions
incorporated into the CWA are discussed in the following
sections. Each case illustrates some of the practical conse-
quences of the CWA's fundamental tension-the struggle
to protect the integrity of aquatic ecosystems while at the
same time respecting the narrow linguistic boxes set up by
the statutory text.202
A. What Wetland?
The CWA has been interpreted as regulating the destruc-
tion of wetlands through filling (adding soil), but not
through draining (removing water). 20 3 Filling and drain-
ing may produce identical environmental harms, but
receive inconsistent legal treatment.204 his creates a
potential regulatory loophole that can undermine the
CWA's effectiveness.205
In Save Our Community v. EPA,206 a group of citizens
and the city of Ferris, Texas, challenged a waste manage-
ment company's unpermitted draining of a wetland in
preparation for the expansion of an adjacent landfill into
196. Cutaboga River Fire, OHIO HISTORY CENT., http://www.ohiohistorycentral.
org/entryiphp?rec=1642 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
197. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 186, at 556.
198. See id. (describing tendency, when relying on a heuristic, to overestimate fre-
quency of an event).
199. See id. ("Reliance on heuristics and schema allows people to process an amaz-
ing array of complex stimuli efficiently. These devices serve people well most
of the time, but can lead to systematic errors in judgment, which psychologists
often refer to as 'cognitive illusions."').
200. Fischman, supra note 6, at 664.
201. Seegenerall Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 186, at 562-63, 572-75, 579-80
(presenting a novel psychological model of governmental error as a supplement
to the familiar public choice model; discussing the impact of cognitive illu-
sions on Congress; and explaining the effect of cognitive illusions on regulatory
agencies).
202. See id. at 580-81.
203. See Save Our Cmty. v. U.S. Entl. Prot. Agency (SOC1) 741 E Supp. 605, 609
(N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992).
204. See id. at 615.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 607.
Winter 2013
the newly drained area. Over the course of about two years,
the company had used a mechanical pump to remove the
surface water from over half of a twenty-one acre pond. 20 7
It intended to drain the entire pond, but the district court
issued a preliminary injunction to remain in effect until
the company obtained a section 404 permit from the
Corps."" The district court admitted that "the [CWA] and
its accompanying regulations are reasonably interpreted
as focusing primarily on discharges,"209 but found a func-
tional interpretation of the Act more compelling than a
narrow linguistic interpretation. 210 Finding that continued
operation of the pump threatened "significant alteration or
destruction of a wetland,""" the district court grounded its
injunction in pragmatic concerns. Refusing to believe that
the CWA "permits the wanton destruction of wetlands
through draining activities "'212 the court explained that
"[i]t would seem to stand logic on its head ... to permit
a landowner to avoid the § 404(b) process by completely
draining a wetland and then claiming 'Permit for what
wetland?""" The court expressed outrage that the defen-
dant had drained the wetlands for the express purpose of
circumventing the CWA, and that the defendant's clear
goal was to fill in the wetland-the very evil that the stat-
ute seeks to prevent.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dissolved the district court's
injunction214 and recognized a clear distinction between
draining (which did not trigger the jurisdiction of the
CWA) and filling (which satisfied the jurisdictional trigger
of a "discharge").215 Rejecting the district court's functional
approach, the Fifth Circuit explained, "[t]he conclusion is
inescapable. The existence of discharge is critical."216 Despite
the reality that many acres of wetlands are destroyed through
draining, as well as filling, the Fifth Circuit's strict adher-
ence to the textual requirement of a "discharge" appears to
be representative of the few cases that have considered the
issue.217 At the time of the Save Our Community litigation,
the nation was losing its wetlands at a rate of about 300,000
acres each year. 218
207. Id. at 609.
208. Id. at 607-09.
209. Id. at 613.
210. Id. at 615.
211. Id. at 611.
212. Id. at 615 (internal citations omitted).
213. Id.
214. Save Our Cmty. v. U.S. Entl. Prot. Agency (SOCII), 971 F2d 1155, 1155
(5th Cir. 1992).
215. Id. at 1165.
216. Id. at 1163.
21'. WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDs REGULATION § 4:35, 4-42 (2012) (not-
ing a 1990 Corps guidance memorandum "which attempts to narrow the
exemption for drainage") see also Borden Ranch PJip v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 261 E 3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that deep ripping, which
results in soil being "wrenched up, moved around, and redeposited somewhere
else" can constitute a discharge), aff'd, 537 U.S. 99 (2002); Am. Mining Cong.
v. US. Army Corps ofEngrs, 951 E Supp. 267, 273 (D.D.C. 199) (finding
that Congress' definition of "discharge" has a "definite meaning" that is not
meant to include incidental fallback).
218. Save Our Cmty v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (SOC1), 741 E Supp. 605, 612
n.9 (N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992).
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B. Good Cop, Bad Cop
Would a rational legislature order exacting pollution limits,
yet call all bets off if the pollutant, discharged into a lake,
will raise the water body's elevation?
-CoeurAlaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)2 1
Both the Corps and EPA play a role in the regulation of
surface mining for coal, gold, and other minerals, with the
former regulating fill material and the latter regulating pol-
lutants. m The distinction between those two materials, how-
ever, is not always clear. In cases of ambiguity, which agency
should regulate, and why does it matter? In the case of a
gold mine in Alaska, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a
hierarchy under which EPA has authority only if the Corps
does not. 1 As a result, the Corps' more lenient section 404
permitting requirements may displace EPA's more stringent
exercise of authority.222
In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, the Court considered the petitioner's plans to
reopen the Kensington Gold Mine, located about forty-
five miles north of Juneau, Alaska.2 The mining waste,
known as "slurry," would be generated by a process known
as "froth-flotation" and would be composed of crushed rock
(about thirty percent), water, and chemicals. The company
intended to dispose of the slurry in a natural lake about three
miles from the mine. 225 In the words of the dissent,
Petitioner ... proposes to discharge 210,000 gallons per
day of mining waste into Lower Slate Lake, a 23-acre sub-
alpine lake in Tongass National Forest. The 'tailings slurry'
would contain concentrations of aluminum, copper, lead
and mercury. Over the life of the mine, roughly 4.5 million
tons of solid tailings would enter the lake, raising the bot-
tom elevation by 50 feet. It is undisputed that the discharge
would kill all of the lake's fish and nearly all of its other
aquatic life. 226
The majority described the facts in more benign terms:
"[tlhough the slurry will at first destroy the lake's small
population of common fish, that population may later be
replaced. After mining operations are completed, Coeur
Alaska will help reclaim the lake by capping the tailings with
about four inches of native material."2
The dispute raised the issue of whether the slurry should
be regulated by the Corps or by EPA. On the one hand, sec-
tion 404 provides that the Corps "may issue permits ... for
219. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 304
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 45', 467-68 (2001)).
220. See id. at 287-88.
221. See id at 274.
222. See id. at 273.
223. See id at 26'.
224. See id.
225. See id
226. Id. at 296-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22'. Id. at 269 (majority opinion) (internal quotations and citations ornitted).
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the discharge of dredged or fill material[s] . . . ." Regu-
lations issued jointly by the Corps and EPA define "fill
material" to include "slurry . . . or similar mining-related
materials" that have the "effect of . .. [c]hanging the bot-
tom elevation" of water 2 On the other hand, section 402
asserts that "[e]xcept as provided in . . . [Section 404,
EPA] . . . may . . . issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant . . . .". The Act defines the term broadly to
include, "dredged spoil, solid waste, . . . sewage, garbage,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
heat . . . and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste
discharged into water."2 3' Further, under CWA section 306,
EPA had promulgated a new source performance standard
that specifically forbade froth-flotation gold mines, such as
the Kensington Gold Mine, from discharging process waste-
water: "there shall be no discharge of process wastewater to
navigable waters from mills that use the froth-flotation pro-
cess ... for the beneficiation of... gold."232
The Court acknowledged that the statute is ambiguous
as to whether section 306 applies to fill material that falls
within the scope of section 404.233 But anxious to avoid cre-
ating "numerous difficulties for the regulated industry,"
the Court concluded that the CWA is "best understood to
provide that if the Corps has authority to issue a permit for
a discharge under § 404, then EPA lacks authority to do so
under § 402."23 As a result, the more stringent EPA perfor-
mance standards did not apply to the mine.26
To supplement the majority's careful separation of the
CWA's "fill" box from its "pollutant" box, the dissent would
have taken a functional approach.237 Although it agreed that
the section 402 and section 404 permitting schemes are
mutually exclusive, it would have concluded that the subject
discharge fell within the scope of section 402 and its related
performance standards.238 The implications of making the
wrong choice, the dissent feared, were "weighty."23 9 In par-
ticular, it worried that the majority's interpretation would
provide an "escape hatch" for polluters who added solid mat-
ter to their discharges: 240 "[t]he Court's reading ... strains
228. CWA§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). EPA has the authority to veto the
Corps' issuance of a permit under section 404(c) but has exercised that author-
ity rarely. As of 2009, EPA exercised its veto "only a dozen times over 36 years
encompassing more than 1 million permit applications." Coeur Alaska, Inc. v.
Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 55' U.S. 261, 303 n.5 (2009) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). EPA issued another withdrawal of specification in 2010, but
in 2012 a federal district court invalidated that action as beyond the statutory
authority of EPA. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
850 E Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012).
229. 40 C.ER. § 232.2 (2012).
230. CWA § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006).
231. CW4 § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).
232. 40 C.ER. § 440.104(b)(1) (2012)z see Coeur Alska, Inc., 55' U.S. at 266,
270-71, 278 (majority opinion); id. at 297, 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see
abo CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2006) (mills must be included as a new
source category, for which the administrator must establish federal regulations
creating performance standards).
233. Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 U.S. at 281-82.
234. Al. at 276.
235. Id. at 274.
236. Al. at 27'.
237. Id. at 296-304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
238. Al. at 29', 301, 304.
239. Id. at 300.
240. Al. at 302-03.
Winter 2013
Copyright 02013 Environmental Law Institute@ and The George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission.
credulity. A discharge of a pollutant, otherwise prohibited
by firm statutory command, becomes lawful if it contains
sufficient solid matter to raise the bottom of a water body,
transformed into a waste disposal facility."241 The dissent
concluded that the majority's opinion ran counter to the
"text, structure, and purpose" of the CWA.242
IV. Conclusion:Thinking Outside the Box
The CWA has achieved much success in improving water
quality. In part, these triumphs have been facilitated by the
statute's clearly-defined, step-by-step plan for cleaning up the
nation's waters. 24 But the statute is also limited by its com-
partmentalized structure. As this Article reveals, many of the
241. Id. at 302.
242. Id. at 297-98. The distinction between "pollutants" and "fill" is also relevant
in the context of so-called mountaintop removal mining" common in the Ap-
palachian region. See Jason Rappa, Coal and aer: R climi ng the Clean ater
Actfor EnvzironmnentalProtection, 2) TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 101-05, 108 (2011).
243. See Glicksrnan & Batzel, supra note 122, at 130-31.
CWAs limitations resulted from unfortunate political and
cognitive constraints at the time of the legislation's enact-
ment, rather than careful legislative design. Moving into
the twenty-first century, EPA has called for implementation
strategies that go beyond the statute's rigid, compartmental-
ized origins and for "a shift from a program-by-program,
source-by-source, pollutant-by-pollutant approach to more
holistic watershed-based strategies."244 Congress must join
EPA in this effort to strengthen and modernize the CWA.
In particular, armed with historical insights such as those
provided by this Article, Congress should revisit and amend
the CWA to reflect a more progressive and holistic approach
to environmental regulation.
244. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2, 29
(n.d.), available athttp://cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/pdf/modules/IntrotoCWA.
pdf.
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